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Over a Decade Later…What Now? What Next? 
A Multi-Layer Assessment of Terrorism in its Current and Future Manifestation 
 “So America is at a crossroads. We must define the nature and scope of this struggle, or else it 
will define us. We have to be mindful of James Madison's warning that ‘No nation could 
preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare.’ Neither I, nor any President, can 
promise the total defeat of terror. We will never erase the evil that lies in the hearts of some 
human beings, nor stamp out every danger to our open society. But what we can do—what we 
must do—is dismantle networks that pose a direct danger to us, and make it less likely for new 
groups to gain a foothold, all the while maintaining the freedoms and ideals that we defend. 
And to define that strategy, we have to make decisions based not on fear, but on hard-earned 
wisdom. That begins with understanding the current threat that we face.” 
                                       President Barack Obama (May 2013, NDU) 
“...[W]e face a persistent terrorist threat that is diversifying along the shifts we are 
seeing in the political, social, and economic environment worldwide...We also see 
evolutions in the homegrown threat, driven in part by easy access to radicalizing 
content on the internet. These changes come against the backdrop of a diminishing al-
Qa'ida core and a mix of affiliates that for the most part are more locally and regionally 
focused... And here at home, we confront adherents to al-Qa'ida's ideology that are, for 
the most part, homegrown violent extremists...While this threat is not new, the 
availability of radicalizing material and instructions for carrying out attacks have made 
it more potent... To confront this more diverse threat, the United States has stepped up 
our counterterrorism responses at every turn. Now, more than a decade beyond 9/11, 
we have the opportunity to take stock and examine what we mean when we talk about 
‘CT.’” 
Lisa Monaco, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security 
and Counterterrorism (excerpt from remarks at the Council on 
Foreign Relations, 14 June 2013, New York City) 
 
“The relentless advance of science and technology is making it possible for smaller and smaller 
groups to kill larger and larger numbers of people.”   
Graham Allison, Director, Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science 
& International Affairs, Harvard University 
  





Introduction and Scope 
This report is primarily an analytical product intended to provide a range of perspectives on terrorism 
and possible responses to it.  Contributors to this report come from three primary groups:  social science 
researchers, interagency analysts, and military operations officers. In essence, it is a marriage of 
contemporary social science theory, applied research, and hard-earned operational experience. The 
paper is limited in scope and is intended to challenge the reader to ask better, more relevant questions 
about terrorism. It aims to be “descriptive” not “prescriptive,” though a degree of implied bias may be 
evident in parts. The purpose of this paper is to accomplish the following: 
• explore how scholars, practitioners, and operators delineate and frame “terrorism”1 in both its 
current manifestation and as anticipated in the future; and 
• seek to better refine and address the “disease” (preconditions, perceptions, and underlying 
drivers) and not just the “symptoms” (terrorist attacks) of terrorism.  
The summarized insights reported below are based on comments made during multiple, semi-structured 
telephone interview sessions conducted between 06 May and 12 June 2013.2 During the interviews, 
there was no attempt to reach consensus. Rather, emphasis was placed on eliciting a range of ideas and 
insights on terrorism and effective responses to it. As such, what is reported here is multi-perspective 
and non-categorical in approach. It serves primarily as a repository of a variety of views on the problem 
set rather than serving as a coherent blueprint. Interviewees are not quoted directly but are listed as 
contributors on the front cover of this report. 
The ultimate aim of the paper is to contribute to the ongoing national dialogue on terrorism and 
perhaps even spark some new thinking around three ideas upon which there remains public debate: 
• the merits of a whole-of-nation response to terrorism; 
• the value of creating an inclusive national defense narrative that is clear, inclusive, and 
helpful for explaining to domestic and international audiences what the U.S. is fighting for  
• what it means to define our terrorism response in accordance with our nation’s values 
 
                                                          
1 Although there was not consensus among interviewees on a single definition of “terrorism,” in the following write-up, unless 
otherwise noted, we define terrorism broadly as "the use, or threatened use, of violence for political and/or ideological goals by 
non-state groups aimed at (non-combatant) victims who are selected for their symbolic or representative value as a means of 
instilling anxiety in, transmitting one or more messages to, and thereby manipulating the attitudes and behavior of a wider 
target audience or audiences."  
2 See Appendices A and B for interview questions and interview notes, respectively. Appendices C and D list key insights from 
two previously published white papers relevant to this topic: “Topics in The Neurobiology of Aggression: Implications to 
Deterrence” (Feb 2013) and “Topics in Operational Considerations on Insights from Neurobiology on Influence and Extremism” 
(April 2013). To obtain copies of the notes or the white papers, please contact Sarah Canna at scanna@nsiteam.com.  
 




Summary & Key Insights 
 
a. Terrorism is not a singular category of behavior; describing distinct behaviors as if they were 
the same has obscured both the threat(s) and countering strategies. The contexts, modes of, 
and motivations for modern terrorist behaviors are too diverse to consider as a single category 
of activity. Today, terrorism has many of the characteristics of an entrepreneurial, adaptive, and 
dynamic competition. Even al Qaeda (AQ) and its adherents do not necessarily represent a 
homogenous movement.  
 
b. Terrorism is a tactic, not an existential threat in and of itself.  
1. From an operational perspective, counterterrorism (CT) implies what we are fighting 
against, not what we are fighting for. This becomes problematic when the national 
strategy for dealing with terrorism is couched in such terms. The political objective, 
along with the fundamental American values that guide U.S. goals in world affairs, 
should be discussed and shared to those within the United States Government (USG), 
the U.S. population, and abroad to improve policy understanding and reduce 
uncertainty.  
2. Elevating CT from core special operations doctrinal activity to the level of national 
strategy may unwittingly constrain response options due to the narrow set of activities 
associated with CT itself. It may be time to consider a more appropriately named and 
comprehensive strategy that accounts for the full range of legitimate responses to 
terrorism and its drivers. 
3. Some have dubbed this a “war of narratives.” Yet, the complexity of terrorism has 
caused some to seek a simple description of the problem when this is, in fact, 
impossible. Terrorism is not a monolithic movement, and it should not be characterized 
as such.  
4. Nevertheless, during the past 10 years, some have applied reductionist logic to create 
shallow, bias-affirming descriptions of the phenomenon of terrorism that are not helpful 
in developing appropriate responses to terrorism. Similar to stereotyping, the problem 
with single-narrative descriptions is not that they are completely untrue, but that they 
are irresponsibly incomplete. Further, single-narrative descriptions of terrorism and 
violent extremism often lack necessary context and, therefore, contribute to 
misunderstandings that create fertile conditions for misinformed decision-making.  
5. Interviewees noted that there is no grand unifying theory of terrorism in the social 
sciences: there are no direct, consistent, and generalizable root sources of the use of 
terrorism as a tactic for redress of individual or group political, ethnic, or religious 
grievances. In other words, because of the diversity of contexts and motivations, there is 
no factor—whether on a neurobiological, cognitive, group, or social level—that explains 
all terrorist behaviors. On the other hand, many interviewees argued that it is possible 
to identify certain “risk factors” that are correlated with the propensity for terrorism-




related behaviors (e.g., perceived zero-sum type threats to social identity, years living 
under violently repressive government, weak governments, economic stress, etc.).  
6. Most interviewees did not view ideology in and of itself as a necessarily strong driver of 
terrorism. Ideology can, however, be opportunistically exploited or can provide frames 
for attaching meaning to objective and subjective experiences. It may also influence 
multiple dimensions of terrorist activities including group creation, overarching 
connectivity, and propagation. 
7. Some interviewees posited in terms of practicality, that communications focusing on 
determining target audience motivations as an approach toward achieving behavioral 
outcomes are the most tactically prudent and operationally relevant during military 
operations as they focus on mitigating or encouraging specific actions that can be 
observed and measured. 
 
c. A whole-of-nation terrorism response policy may offer new opportunities for domestic and 
international engagement. Effective approaches to terrorism should consider domestic civil 
society, commercial, and non-profit involvement as necessary force multipliers. 
 
d. A convergence of available technologies and information imply a new generation of potential 
vulnerabilities and threats to the U.S. The convergence of rapidly advancing scientific sectors 
(biotech, nanotech, energy, materials, etc.) combined with the availability of CBCT (Cyber-Based 
Communication Technology) ecosystem could produce an entirely new generation of threat 
capabilities. Technologies can be combined in innovative ways to produce damaging capabilities 
previously unseen and not envisioned by their original design. Disruptive and catastrophic 
technologies could both emerge and merge faster and more unpredictably than our ability to 
monitor and forecast them. Considering the lead-in quote by Graham Allison earlier in this 
document, these factors may create entirely new vulnerabilities that are exploited by terrorists 
in pursuit of their goals.  
 
e. Having a multi-framework assessment for domestic and international terrorism may help 
better understand the phenomenon and the range of drivers impacting this process. Some 
homegrown terrorists do have clear motivations and may even follow instructions given to them 
by larger organizations. In other instances, domestic terrorists may not be able to express a well-
developed, cogent ideology and often may have only tenuous connections, if any, to the parts of 
the world that they claim to be representing. 
 
  




The following insights represent the (non-summarized) span of answers to questions and comments 
received from interviewees. They are organized roughly in accordance with the general interview 
questions listed in Appendix A. 
Defining Terrorism and Terrorist Activities 
 
a. Achieving international consensus on what constitutes terrorism remains a challenge as states 
tend to define terrorism in ways most advantageous to them. The old aphorism “One person’s 
terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter,” embodies,” the difficulty of not only finding a 
common definition, but common understanding. However, most interviewees presented some 
version of the following definition: 
 
"The use or threatened use of violence for political and/or ideological goals by non-state 
groups aimed at (non-combatant) victims, who are selected for their symbolic or 
representative value as a means of instilling anxiety in, transmitting one or more messages to, 
and thereby manipulating the attitudes and behaviors of a wider target audience or 
audiences."  
 
In this context, terrorism is a three-part act: the first act is violence; the second is the framing, 
broadcasting, and interpretation of the violence by the perpetrators and their audiences; and 
the third is the array of responses to these interpretations. It is through their responses that 
different audiences advertise whether they are treating a particular event as a crime, an act of 
war, or an act of terror.  
 
b. Terrorism and violent extremism (VE)3 are not synonymous. VE is a broad, vague, and highly 
subjective and evaluative notion (i.e., what is considered to be extreme to one party might seem 
like a necessary response to another). VE is a way of thinking that uses violence to promote 
one’s views (political, religious, etc.). It can include terrorism and other forms of violence. VE 
prepares the mindset for a person to become a terrorist. While terrorism is a tactic, VE is a 
process of thinking that can ultimately lead to terrorism or other forms of violence.  
 
c. It is important to understand the difference between asymmetric warfare (AW) and 
counterterrorism (CT). AW seeks to exploit relative power between conflicting parties to gain 
advantage, which means in some cases using an opponent’s strength against them. Thus 
asymmetrical approaches does not necessarily spell easy victory for the stronger of the two 
sides if the weaker side can exploit the other side’s strength more effectively. Thus, variations in 
power will usually be correlated with variations in tactics.   
                                                          
3 Violent extremism (VE) is a way of thinking that can encompass various forms of violence. Asymmetric warfare is different 
from VE because it deals with the power balance between conflicting parties. 
 





d. Ideological dimension(s): Most interviewees did not view ideology by itself as a necessarily 
strong driver of terrorism. However ideology does influence multiple dimensions of terrorist 
activities including group creation, overarching connectivity, and propagation. It is often  
1. a facilitating property that encourages formation (the emergence of) new terror cells 
from a society when it combines with other environmental factors; 
2. a functional property that influences connectedness across multiple, heterogeneous 
terror cells as well as between such cells and societal groups not actively participating in 
terrorist action; and 
3. a common, unifying context that shapes and coordinates behaviors of both terror and 
societal groups without the need for any centralized control. 
In each case, ideology can be a contributing factor or a tool intentionally appropriated to serve 
as an established backbone that serves more entrepreneurial terror goals.  
e. Sociopsychological dimensions: Interviewees noted that there is no grand unifying theory of 
terrorism in the social sciences. Ten years of concerted research effort has failed to identify a 
unified path to radicalization4 or a common root cause of terrorism. 
1. Understanding incentive structures in addition to risk factors5 that shape behavior are 
key elements for assessing terrorist behavior. The social science research available 
today is able to correlate the aggregate propensity of terrorist behaviors with some 
underlying conditions. 
2. Radicalization may occur at both cognitive and behavioral levels and is likely to be 
shaped by emotional responses to perceived hostile forces that are themselves 
conceptualized within a social milieu. The decision-making processes of radicalized and 
radicalizing individuals are likewise affected by (social) cognition, emotions (such as 
anger, fear, and disgust), and moral intuitions. Understanding the human or cognitive 
dimension underlying the transition from early radicalization to VE is an important 
element in a comprehensive CT strategy. 
3. Non-radicalized support or passive acquiescence can significantly enable the spread and 
effectiveness of terror groups. The non-radicalized audience is, therefore, an equally 
vital group to understand and address in innovative information operation strategies for 
the future. 
                                                          
4 Radicalization refers to changes in beliefs, feelings, and actions toward increased support for one side of a political conflict. 
Radicalization of beliefs and feelings often occurs for a mass audience, whereas radicalization of action is relatively rare, 
especially for violent extremism and terrorism. 
 
5 Risk factors are discussed in section 8. 




Assess Terrorist Groups According to Their Business Model 
 
a. Whether small cells or larger enterprises, terror groups are entrepreneurial. When we define 
terror groups (regardless of their size) as entrepreneurial, we mean that they embody the 
characteristics that we in the West attribute to successful entrepreneurial spirit and action. 
Namely, as recently described by Forbes, they 
1. are dissatisfied with the present and have a vision of how things “should be;” 
2. can rapidly ascertain their advantages and optimize them;  
3. excel, often innovatively adapting their domestic and international communication 
efforts to bring others on board and articulating their vision; 
4. learn quickly, are flexible, and open to feedback from like-minded groups; and 
5. express persistence in executing plans. 
 
b. As such, terror groups tend to be to be highly adaptive, proactive, aggressively opportunistic, 
and frequently technically and tactically innovative. They generally act/change with far more 
alacrity than established institutions. By considering and assessing them in accord with their 
own business models, we may capture and better anticipate the changing nature of terror 
activities and their perpetrators more completely and intuitively. We define the “business 
model” of a terror group as “the means and methods embraced to support execution of the 
vision,” specifically, how they achieve their goals along all the entrepreneurial dimensions 
captured above. 
c. Terrorism also has the characteristics of an adaptive and dynamic competition. It is not 
homogenous, and we must show discipline in avoiding single-narrative descriptors of terrorists 
and the groups they claim to represent. The goal is to appreciate the complexity of terrorism 
and the ways terrorists behave as part of a violent enterprise. Some interviewees suggested that 
in order to combat it, the USG should be equally entrepreneurial and resilient. 
d. Terror groups may operate as enterprises (more centralized, hierarchical organizations) or 
franchises (largely independent, autonomously acting groups bound together however loosely 
by ideology). The form they take can be expected to be the one that will flourish in a given 
environment. As franchises, terror cells may be loosely connected to a higher order 
organization. Alternately, they may simply appropriate the “brand” and remain completely 
operationally autonomous. 
e. It is reasonable to expect that terror groups with these characteristics will eventually find a way 
to achieve their objectives as long as their motivating issues remain unaddressed. As such, they 
do pose a threat to developed democracies. They are much more of a threat to fragile and 
transitional states—especially those transitioning from authoritarianism to democracy—and, as 
such, a threat to us and our values. In this context, the ability to continually reassess how 
terrorists and their networks are adapting and evolving to a changing environment is very 
important. 




f. What the U.S. does or does not do is just as important as what the terrorists do, if not more so, 
given the asymmetric capabilities and impact of government actions. A key question that should 
inform every action against terrorists is, “Are we fighting the enemy’s strategy or their forces?” 
Geopolitical Trends Will Impact the Evolution of Terrorism 
a. There are four significant trends likely to emerge as we move forward: 
1. Demographic change: The population of allied U.S. countries are growing older and 
increasing the demand for domestic social spending, making it more difficult to assist 
the U.S. in joint international ventures. With some exceptions, youth bulges are slowing 
down in the developing world. 
2. Resource stress: Globally, there is increased urbanization, a growing middle class, and a 
greater demand for resources and governance effective enough to deliver them. The 
rapid growth in urbanization, in particular, means that when natural or man-made 
disasters strike urban areas, they are more likely to be catastrophic in terms of 
population displacement and loss of life. 
3. Further diffusion of power: An equalization of power in the international system may 
make it more difficult to resolve international issues and lead to concerns about the 
fragmentation of the international system. 
4. Individual empowerment: Individual empowerment, together with weak government 
capacity, could fuel grievances by generating an environment in which dramatic and 
violent individual actions are easier to accomplish. An increased availability of precision 
strike weapons in the hand of individuals is, therefore, a growing concern.  
b. Opportunistic quest for power by non-state actors: A new world order was created in 1945-
1946 directed in large part by Western states and ideas. We may be seeing a breakdown of this 
throughout the world as U.S. and Western values no longer have the same pull as they had in 
the past. As a result, the important question to understand is, what are we really up against?  
 
c. For a state, the cost of supporting, tolerating, or fomenting terrorism is that it risks becoming an 
international pariah. However, for some weak states, terrorism may be an attractive alternative. 
A state with weak conventional capabilities may see terrorism as a tool to influence their 
environment, go after enemies, or use as a deterrent. In some cases, strong states such as North 
Korea with strong conventional capabilities may also support terrorism. 
 
d. If future trends (such as youth bulges, resource constraints, growing middle classes, etc.) place 
pressures on states for better governance, it could create an environment in which populations 
rise up to force change. This could facilitate democratization in the future. Good governance and 
strong institutions coupled with capacity building (e.g., judicial systems, police, intelligence, and 
eradicating corruption) are key to avoiding bad outcomes.  





e. Disruptive technologies and sociotechnological revolution 
1. Cyber-Based Communication Technology (CBCT) advances have produced fundamental 
alterations in the temporal and spatial scales of communication and information 
sharing. These transform both individual and community (up to state and even trans-
state) patterns of organization. CBCTs are increasingly pervasive, connecting other 
technological sectors and societies in new ways and on new time scales and 
exacerbating global competition for finite resources.  
2. CBCT exhibits a complex, two-dimensional impact on societal structure and dynamic 
behaviors. It is both a means and an ecosystem spawning a global sociotechnical 
evolution.   
3. Cyber-based and cyber-facilitated terrorism is a huge threat in the 21st Century. The 
cyber realm may be a direct target of attack (e.g., with severe and perhaps societally 
lethal economic or other infrastructure effects), or it may be a medium through which a 
mass attack is conducted. CBCT dramatically increases the reach of terror on the societal 
psyche on a never-before-realized scale. Terror acts are now “seen” globally 
immediately after or even during an attack. Such “fame” was not previously achievable 
so readily, which is a significant motivator of many lone wolf types and small terror cells. 
4. A complex adaptive system (CAS) contains multiple, heterogeneous elements 
interacting with each other and the environment to create system behaviors and 
characteristics not found at the individual element level (i.e., emergence of new 
systems). The scale one is considering (e.g., a cell, a human, a society) determines what 
behaviors and characteristics one can observe. The CBCT ecosystem, our sociotechnical 
society, and terror cells are all CAS. Each has aspects of existence that are part of the 
other systems and the environment external to those systems. 
5. Loosely connected autonomous cells may combine opportunistically via the CBCT 
ecosystem to conduct synergistic attacks with significant impact. The sheer extent of 
cyberspace and its transience greatly hinders our abilities to foresee such events. 
Groups whose ideologies would otherwise preclude them from collaborating may 
overcome their social barriers and even hybridize. Technological barriers are then easier 
to surmount. 
6. The convergence of rapidly advancing scientific sectors (biotech, nanotech, energy, 
materials, etc.), together with the CBCT ecosystem, may produce an entirely new 
generation of threats. Technologies are being innovatively combined in different ways 
to produce damaging capabilities previously unforeseen and not envisioned by design. 
Disruptive and catastrophic technologies may emerge and merge faster and more 
unpredictably than our ability to monitor and forecast them.  




Defense of U.S. Interests Requires a Whole-of-Government and 
Sometimes a Whole-of-Nation Approach 
 
a. There have been numerous productive interagency efforts to better comprehend and confront 
terrorism both domestically and abroad. Continued cooperation across the USG led by the 
National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) is still required despite the decrease in AQ and their 
affiliated movements’ capabilities. This coordination needs to encompass not only the military 
and national, state, and local law enforcement but also health services, boards of education, and 
the private sector to address a continuing threat. 
b. An adaptive, multi-faceted threat requires an equally adaptive and multi-faceted response. 
c. Because both states and groups that pose threats to U.S. interests and because citizens are 
increasingly diverse, dispersed, networked, decentralized and adaptive, a single coordinated 
security strategy may be impractical. At the same time, any U.S. strategy on terrorism must 
consider the range of options available beyond the narrow portfolio of counterterror 
operations. Part of the strategy is to reach out to two categories of individuals: namely trusted 
intermediaries and subject matter experts (SMEs). The first group is valuable because of their 
street credibility. SMEs are vital strictly at the enforcement level. 
d. Just as it is understood that the best way to confront a network is with a network, a diverse and 
adaptive threat must be confronted with a diverse set of assets and expertise such as those that 
span the USG or, even better, the whole of U.S. society. This will include a component of 
strategic patience and public resilience in the event of violent attack. 
Are Current U.S. CT Strategies Framed Appropriately for Current and 
Evolving Threats? 
 
a. CT strategy needs to explicitly deal with counter radicalization. Dealing with terrorism alone is 
like treating the symptoms and not the disease.  
b. CT refers to what we are fighting against, not what we are fighting for. The key values that guide 
U.S. goals in world affairs should be made clear to those within the USG, the U.S. population, 
and abroad.  
1. This will ensure the development of security strategy and guidance that is consistent 
across time and across agencies and that describes what it is trying to accomplish.  
2. A narrower perspective on CT as countering or defeating the activities of target groups 
once they have pursued terrorism is a reasonable starting point.  




3. CT could also be viewed more broadly as operations to reframe the context within 
which terrorist activities emerge such as countering narratives, promoting governance, 
working to ameliorate social inequities, etc. Pursuing both simultaneously can be 
challenging. 
c. What is the end state sought with CT? A strategy should establish measurable goals. 
1. Some interviewees suggested that the USG needs a full spectrum CT strategy that 
addresses the full scope of the terrorism equation. They argued that this CT strategy 
would seek to ameliorate the inputs that lead to terrorism such as environmental 
conditions, psychological and sociological preconditions, extremist narratives and 
mobilization structures, and transformative processes. It would also address the outputs 
of this equation by taking appropriate actions to deter, punish, and influence those 
actors who make the transition into terrorism. Perhaps of greatest import, it would also 
seek to address feedback loops, wherein the terrorist violence and responses to it 
create additional incentives to continue or escalate a terrorist campaign. 
2. In some cases, this means working with partner governments to address environmental 
factors. A flexible response policy that allows the U.S. to reserve the right to eliminate 
groups that threaten our national security interests is needed.  
d. More emphasis can be put on addressing the conditions that allow anti-Western ideology to 
thrive.  
e. We have to achieve congruence and continuity between domestic and foreign policy. Until we 
can show success of domestic policies, how can we hope to export that through soft power or 
any kind of power? We need to close the say/do gap by starting at home. 
f. As part of U.S. CT strategy, the USG must consider enhancing American resilience to future 
attacks. Political resilience means a public that does not believe it can be 100% safe from 
terrorism, does not insist on blaming someone when a terrorist attack occurs, and does not 
insist on a bigger security state after each terrorist attack. 
g. As part of U.S. CT strategy, the USG should consider options to enhance American resilience to 
future terrorist attacks. Political resilience means a public that does not believe it can be 100% 
safe from terrorism, does not insist on blaming someone when a terrorist attack occurs, and 
does not insist on a bigger security state after each terrorist attack. 
h. Stepping on a hornet’s nest: Sometimes U.S. intervention in a region unintentionally 
exacerbates existing tensions, drawing resistance and uniting people against an outside force.  
i. Actions against terrorist groups have to be carefully thought through for unintended 
consequences. Actions can result in short term improvement but can have long-term downsides 
that have to be taken seriously. 




j. Assessing effectiveness: 
1. Since the USG has not properly framed the problem with respect to terrorism, it will be 
difficult to effectively measure the U.S. impact of CT efforts beyond short-term tactical 
actions.  
2. Establishing a system of tracking all USG counter-terrorism activity remains a challenge. 
Nevertheless, it is also key to maintaining faith with the American people. 
Risk Factors, Contributing Causal Factors, or Accelerants 
 
a. There is no single cause of terrorism. There is no single cause that explains all terrorist behaviors 
whether on a neurobiological, cognitive, group, or social level. That said, there are risk factors 
that can be statistically correlated to terrorist activities. However, these tend to be so broad as 
to greatly over-predict potential threats to U.S. security. A better method than attempting to 
identify “root-causes” is a model that explains the gestation, growth, and dissemination of 
terrorist organizations. In that regard, there is a constellation of inputs across which 
transformation can occur.  
1. Much of what we need to understand is at the sociocognitive level. Risk factors include 
the proportion of military aged men (MAMs) in a population, lack of access to resources, 
emotional vulnerability, psychological proximity to violence, personal history of violent 
behavior and concomitant narratives, dissatisfaction with the status quo and with the 
effects of political activism, personal connection to a grievance, positive (or at least non-
negative) view of violence, a perceived benefit of political violence, a social network that 
includes radicalized individuals, humiliation, and a resonant radical narrative, and a 
perceived threat to social identity coupled with psychological characteristics.  
2. At the group level, risk factors include the resources of a group (especially external 
funding), the increasing de-legitimization of peaceful rhetoric, increasing discontent 
with the status quo, and failed attempts to resolve issues via political processes.  
3. Organizational risk factors include de-legitimization of an out-group, resources, external 
support, perceived threat, a current state of conflict, and competition with other 
groups. 
4. Historically, most terrorism has not been directed against the U.S. It is optimistic to 
think that addressing grievances will end terrorism, but U.S. actions do affect others and 
may cause grievances. Other factors include globalization, the information revolution, 
and a culture of grievance. They may perceive our culture as a threat to their way of life. 
They try to answer the marching forward of westernization by looking back to the 
perfect past that only exists in mythology.  




b. Academic research on oppression and social mobilizations suggests that violent social 
movements come about because of a lack of a legitimate political mechanism to express 
discontent. However, some mobilizing resources such as finances, narratives, justifying causes, 
and an overall motivating frame that is justice oriented are needed. There is an inverted-U 
shaped relationship between repressive governments and the likelihood of government 
repression. Extremely repressive regimes have sufficiently quelled their populace that they do 
not have to take direct actions to keep organizations under their thumb. Non-repressive regimes 
have neither the inclination nor the institutional structures necessary to engage in significant 
repressive actions. In the middle, there is enough repression to cause an organization to stand 
up, but the state does not have enough technology or skill to squash the nascent organization. 
This has been claimed to be validated empirically.  
c. The terrorist threat today is more like a spreading, dispersed social movement than a 
hierarchical organization; cells of radicalized individuals come together at will to conduct 
attacks. This social movement is fueled by a number of factors: 
1. terrorism is often the result of the failure of government to provide essential services or 
the result of the success of government oppression; and 
2. instability occurs when governments cannot adapt to key trends. 
d. While ideology is not always a causal factor, and is sometimes simply a rationalization, it can 
definitely be a contributing factor to the decision to engage in terrorism. In those instances 
when ideology is used as a rationalization for taking up violence, people generate or seek a story 
to justify why they are taking violent action. Islam, in that regard, is more their motif than their 
motive. In this sense, ideology plays a key role in reforming the process of thinking. 
e. Improving the rule of law will not by itself get rid of terrorism. Studies linking a lack of rule of 
law with terrorism find only weak correlations. In failing states where the rule of law is not well-
established, non-state groups have an opening to take on the role of the state by providing 
justice and social stability. Yet terrorism has occurred often enough in strong Western states as 
well. 
f. We tend to think about the political science (or economic) rational actor perspective and see 
violence as a rational tactic. However, emotions play a key role. The fields of behavioral 
economics and neuroeconomics can contribute to the development of better CT strategies and 
tactics. From actor-specific (or tailored) deterrent models to personalized persuasion tactics, 
leveraging social, behavioral, neuroscience, and technical resources at our disposal will allow for 
greater strategic flexibility and tactical precision. 
  




International Perspectives on Homegrown Terrorism 
 
a. The framework for looking at homegrown radicalization and terrorism needs to be different 
from that of foreign terrorism not least of all because we have a greater diversity from an 
ideological perspective of viable threats to U.S. interests.  
1. Some homegrown radicals do have clear motivations, and they appear to follow 
instructions given to them by larger organizations.  
2. In other instances, homegrown radicals may not be able to express a well-developed, 
cogent ideology and often may have only tenuous connections, if any, to the parts of 
the world that they claim to be representing or speaking on behalf of. In effect, both the 
political purpose and the engagement elements are notably lacking. In some of these 
cases, the tactic of terror becomes the end in itself. That is why many incidents come 
across as random and pointless, and one of the biggest risks then becomes our attempts 
to provide these with presumed meaning and direction.  
b. In many cases, Muslim youth are not being engaged in a sensible way in western societies 
because engagement processes are launched around questions that deal with religion, 
terrorism, or related matters. A better strategy may be to engage them on issues of education, 
jobs, the environment, and other everyday concerns. 
Key Issues that Require Further Consideration 
a. What do we want the role of the U.S. to be in the future given these trends? Do we want to pull 
back or to lead the world into a new international order? Policymakers need to think about 
where we are heading given those trends in order to position the country to meet its strategic 
objectives. 
b. Anticipated geopolitical trends suggest that the USG should think differently about how it 
interacts with the world. If we do not have the economic capacity or the will to be the world’s 
sole policeman, how do we plan for that role with limited resources? This issue calls for new 
ways of thinking about how to get the international system to work with us and our old and new 
allies.  
c. U.S. and global societies are evolving in large part owing to the sociotechnical confluence and 
rapid Cyber-Based Communication Technology advances. Should we consider that our concept 
of “national security” might need to be dynamic as well? 
d. “Resilience” is usually intended to mean “robust” in a security sense. Yet in ecosystems—and 
our global, sociotechnical society is an ecosystem—resilience typically means that a system is 
able to survive a disruption, though perhaps in a completely different state and balance than 




before. What does this mean for our concept of “national security” and our international goals 
as a nation? 
Key Theoretical Gaps Identified by Interviewees 
a. What causes some people to accept radical opinions? What leads radicalized individuals to take 
action (i.e., move from radicalization to mobilization)? We do not know why some people tacitly 
or actively support terrorists but never become one. CT strategy needs to focus on better 
understanding the behaviors and motivation that lead sympathizers and supporters to become 
terrorists. 
b. What is the relation between public opinion sympathizing with terrorism and terrorist attacks? 
For instance, if a USG intervention could next month halve the percentage of U.S. Muslims who 
justify suicide attacks in defense of Islam, would attempted jihadist attacks in the U.S. go up, 
down, or stay the same in the following six months? 
c. Can we anticipate or even influence how a terrorism threat will end? There are various ways in 
which terrorist groups give up violence; they may gain all or some objectives, may be physically 
destroyed, may be decapitated, and may evolve into crime or electoral politics. The USG needs 
to think through these potential outcomes in determining CT goals. 
d. Too little attention is paid to emotion as source of violence. We tend to assume that terrorists 
are rational actors and commit to violence as a rational tactic. However, there are obvious 
emotions involved in the radicalization process in which individuals join a terrorist group. There 
are also strong emotions, probably different emotions that keep an individual loyal to a terrorist 
group after joining. We need to understand how anger, shame, guilt, and humiliation play out in 
bringing individuals into a terrorist group and keeping them there and what emotions could be 
mobilized to reverse that process.   
e. Emotions are also important in public and government reactions to terrorism. We tend to 
assume that terrorists aim to terrorize, but recent research indicates that reactions to terrorism 
are mediated more by anger and humiliation than by fear. If we want a public that is resilient to 
terrorism, we urgently need to understand emotional reactions to terrorist attack.  
f. Research has found no useful profile for group-based terrorists, but it may be possible to find a 
useful profile of lone actor terrorists. Group-based terrorists are, on the average, normal 
personalities but lone actor terrorists may exhibit signs of mental disorder. 
g. In theory and in practice, how does counterinsurgency relate to counterterrorism? In particular, 
are there lessons for CT in FM3-24 U.S. Army/USMC Counterinsurgency Field Manual? 
h. We need a better approach for estimating the implications (second and third order effects) of 
our actions before we take them. This may include developing a better understanding of 




narratives and how our actions feed into mobilizing narratives. Polling and focus groups may be 
useful in vetting policy options. 
i. We need a better understanding of the narrative environment in which terrorists operate. Part 
of that is understanding how the environment operates as a system. We think of narratives as 
being one thing, but a narrative is a complex system of stories. We need a better idea of what 
the components of a system are, how they relate to each other, how instances of narratives are 
moving from place to place, and how they are used to persuade. This will give us 1) an 
understanding of which groups support which narratives and, therefore, which groups to target 
and 2) how our own actions play into narratives that extremist try to promote. 
j. We need more rigor in the suite of tools we use. For example, if we want to develop resilience 
against extremism and attack, we need to be able to assess the state of resilience and tailor 
interventions that will enable resilience to develop. 
k. We know a lot about terrorists, but we do not know about how their extended family may 









Appendix A: List of Interview Questions6 
[Definition] 
1. We typically define that class of activities that the U.S. is engaged in countering as “the use of 
violence by non-state groups to achieve political aims.” In your view, is this the proper way to 
conceive of this class of activities? Is there general consensus on this among academics, 
operators, practitioners, etc.?  
 
a. Would you say that terrorism and violent extremism are synonymous? 
b. Would you draw a distinction between jihadists, violent extremists, and those engaged 
in asymmetric warfare? 
 
[Strategies]  
2. Current U.S. National Counterterrorism strategy is articulated as “disrupting, dismantling, and 
eventually defeating al-Qa‘ida and its affiliates and adherents to ensure the security of our 
citizens and interests …. [it focuses on] pressuring al-Qa‘ida’s core while emphasizing the need 
to build foreign partnerships and capacity and to strengthen our resilience … this Administration 
has made it clear that we are not at war with the tactic of terrorism or the religion of Islam. We 
are at war with a specific organization—al-Qa‘ida.”  
 
How would you grade U.S. CT efforts, i.e., how are we doing? Do you think the threat of terrorist 
attack is less now than it was, 10 years ago? In your view, is this current strategy framed 
appropriately for what you see as the current threat from terrorism/violent extremism? If so, 
will it remain appropriate for conditions 3-5 years into the future? 6-10 years? 
 
3. Much of U.S. CT efforts have included the notion of “discrediting” AQ and/or extremist ideology. 
Do you see this as a worthwhile activity in countering terrorism/violent extremism or an 
infeasible distraction?  
 
4. What broader message has the United States communicated to global publics through its words, 
deeds, and images regarding CT? 
 
5. What does your research/experience suggest might be the most effective strategies for 
countering terrorism/violent extremism aimed at the U.S. and U.S. interests? What types of 
activities would this entail? 
 
6. How should the U.S. National Strategic objective be defined in this area? For example, should 
the U.S. be concerned with politically motivated extremism whether it is violent or not? If yes, is 
this feasible as a security strategy? If no, why not? 
 
7. Which strategies are likely to be the least effective for countering terrorism? 
 
8. Which activities should the U.S. not pursue if the intent is to counter terrorism? 
                                                          
6 Note that not all questions were asked in each interview session and that some questions were tailored for particular 
interviewees.  





9. Where do you see the gaps in our understanding of terrorism/extremism and the ways to 
counter it? 
 
10. What if anything would you add (or subtract) from the U.S. core principles—adhering to 
U.S. core values, building security partnerships, applying CT tools and capabilities 
appropriately, building a culture of resilience—upon which current CT strategy is based? 
 
[Risk Factors] 
11. We are interested in your views on the full range (e.g., political, economic, social, psychological, 
etc.) of both “risk factors” and contributing factors of terrorism/violent extremism.  
 
a. What do you see/what has your research suggested as the “risk factors” of terrorism 
/violent extremism (e.g., presence of a repressive government; culture of violence)? 
 
b. What do you see/what has your research suggested as the most important contributing 
factors associated with of terrorism /violent extremism (e.g., youth bulge)? 
 
12. Specifically, how does access or the inability to access public goods like individual and public 
health, education, etc., contribute to terrorist activity and/or the emergence of violent 
extremism? 
 
13. Specifically, how do threats to economic stability, for example resulting from natural disasters, 
drought, or disease, contribute to terrorist activity and/or the emergence of violent extremism? 
 
14. Specifically, how does the rule of law—or failures of the rule of law—contribute to terrorist 
activity and/or the emergence of violent extremism? 
 
[Adaptive Nature of Terrorism] 
15. To what degree do you see terrorism against the U.S. as constantly adaptive (e.g., is it a strategic 
adaptation or tactical)? Is it predictable? 
 
16. What are the key features that explain this adaptability (e.g., asymmetries, technological 
advance, lack of operational doctrine, etc.)? 
 




18. How well do you believe we judge the effectiveness of U.S. and allied counter-terror efforts? 
 
19. Given the multitude of potential confounding factors, is it possible to measure the effectiveness 
of our actions? If so, how should this be done? 
 




20. Can you suggest innovative or particularly effective means of gaining indicators of terrorist 
threats—either strategic or tactical? (For academics: In other words, is there one thing that you 
would hope someone is or exploring in this realm?)  
 
21. Is there such a thing as “success” in the context of counter-terrorism? If so, can it be measured 
incrementally (i.e., other than by a dearth of terrorist attack)? Is it necessary, do you think, to 
posit a minimum acceptable level? 
 
  




Appendix B: Interview Session Notes 
(Provided separately, please contact Sarah Canna scanna@nsiteam.com to request a copy) 
  




Appendix C: Key Relevant Insights from a Previously Published White 
Paper Entitled: Topics in the Neurobiology of Aggression: Implications for Deterrence (Feb 2013)7 
 
• It is not possible to understand the biology of behavior without understanding the context in 
which that biology occurs as well as the society in which that individual dwells. This is true in our 
understanding of aggression; there is no highly accurate means of identifying individuals likely to 
commit an impulsive or planned violent act. The context in which aggression and violence occur 
can be modified much more easily than identifying individuals likely to commit aggressive act; by 
manipulating context, society may reduce aggression by individuals indirectly. 
 
• Much aggression is motivated by conflict between in-groups and out-groups. An understanding 
of genetic and environmental factors can elucidate pathways toward aggression and begin to 
explain how various environmental factors such as media, propaganda, or informal mechanisms 
of narrative messaging can be used to manipulate the neurobiological mechanisms that inform 
the psychological architecture of susceptible individuals. In that context, foreign policies that 
overtly impose governance or values alien to local cultures may constitute provocations to 
violence. 
 
• Within groups, punishment and reward cannot be understood outside the context of 
cooperation. Cooperation is stable when defectors can be identified, excluded, and/or punished, 
and when prospective cooperators can be identified, engaged, and rewarded through 
cooperative exchange. Research indicates reward may function less effectively as a behavior-
changing strategy, but may function more effectively as a behavior-sustaining strategy. 
 
• Punishment in the context of group conflict cannot be understood absent the evolutionary logic 
of warfare between groups in an ancestral environment that was “offense dominant.” The 
“secure retaliatory force” that nuclear strategists argue is necessary for equilibrium in the 
nuclear age is nothing but a euphemism for “guaranteed vengeance,” in which states promise a 
punishment that is greater than the benefits of striking first. 
 
• States where the rule of law is weak can beget societies characterized by “culture of honor” 
traditions in which the absence of capable and legitimate third-party enforcement and 
reputation for disproportionate retaliation/punishment becomes the most effective safeguard 
against personal violence. 
 
• Deterrence as a concept may be a long-learned part of our psychology. Because challenges, 
predators, or out-group threat have faced humans for millennia, analyzing the notion of 
                                                          
7 To request a copy of this report, please contact Sarah Canna at scanna@nsiteam.com.  




deterrence from the perspective of evolutionary models may prove helpful. Rational actors have 
an interest in settling issues with threats but without the use of violence. Vengeance is certain 
to be provoked by an attack; deterrence kicks in when the initiators cannot be absolutely sure 
that they will be successful. 
 
  




Appendix D: Key Relevant Insights from a Previously Published White 
Paper Entitled: Topics in Operational Considerations on Insights from Neurobiology on Influence and Extremism (April 2013)8 
 
• Modern information technology is empowering violent extremist organizations (VEOs) by 
providing cheap and anonymous forums to target large audiences. Advances in Cyber-based 
Communication Technology (CBCT) will revolutionize how DOD operates in cyberspace and will 
heighten challenges to Military Information Support Operations or MISO (formerly psychological 
operations or PSYOP). The next twenty years will see a paradigm shift in the fundamental 
character of the Internet that will revolutionize how people interact globally.  
• Communication technologies are means, not ends. They shape social worlds by connecting 
people in distinct ways, but it is the social world itself that creates outcomes.  
 Deemphasizing the distinction between mass media and social media facilitates 
more fruitful exploration of the social implications of different means of 
communication. A four-way communication typology (i.e., speed, directionality, 
span, and configuration) allows exploration of the human terrain.  
 CBCT can blur the lines between physical reality and cyber-formed reality, which 
may differ in delivering catalysts for extremist action while potentially removing 
vital inhibitors.  
o CBCT likely does not contribute to radicalization and mobilization to political extremism 
in a linear fashion. Rather, the various modes of CBCT interact with shaping factors (i.e., 
culture, values, genetic background, access to technology, etc.) and transition factors 
(i.e., activators, catalysts, inhibitors, and interventions) to produce psychological and 
behavioral outcomes.  
o Only a very small subset of individuals becomes more radical in their thinking or 
mobilizes due to interactions with CBCT.  
o The impact of CBCT on a person is dependent on the individual’s motivation for using 
the medium.  
o Bottom line: CBCT often provides isolated individuals the informational equivalent of an 
echo chamber through which they can actively or passively access information that is 
consistently biased toward already expressed preferences and, thus, reinforces and 
strengthens their existing worldviews and limits the probability of their encountering 
information that is potentially contradictory or disconfirming. Tailored search algorithms 
and the psychologically rewarding behavior of participating in "echo-chambers" 
accentuate these tendencies.  
                                                          
8 To request a copy of this report, please contact Sarah Canna at scanna@nsiteam.com. 




• Complex systems concepts provide theoretical frameworks and insights important to designing 
tailored counter violent extremist organizations (VEO) intervention strategies. 
o Neurobiological underpinnings, processes of socialization, and the constantly changing 
modern information environment help illuminate the causes for the bottom up 
emergence of VEOs. In so doing, they help suggest operational approaches to defeat 
them.  
o Socialization has always required communication. The rapid expansion in digital media 
dramatically increases the ways that social groups can form, organize, and plan for 
action.  
o Connectedness in the modern information environment tends to reinforce, not replace, 
basic human needs to connect with others in person.  
o Real complex systems do not resemble static structures to be collapsed; they are usually 
much closer to flexible, constantly respun spider webs. 
o Countering strategies should focus on the interaction of the physical, mental, and moral 
domains instead of physically focused, relatively static center of gravity concepts.  
o Without an understanding of how all three domains relate to one another dynamically, 
one may miss the right points of leverage and combinations of interventions that will 
produce the greatest synergetic effect to influence the direction and momentum of 
constantly evolving social systems.  
o Bottom line: A strategy based on a solid understanding of the dynamic linkages between 
all three social domains (physical, cognitive, and moral), coupled with solid 
comprehension of complexity concepts like bottom up emergence, is more likely to help 
us choose the right combinations of interventions to successfully derail radicalization 
before violent ideas become violent acts and before violence becomes part of the 
unquestionable core identity of the individual and the group.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
